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ABSTRACT  
Today we are reliant on a growing range of space-based assets. To assess inherent space-related risks it is critical to 
evaluate existing and planned systems.  Here we summarise 2019-2020 findings from a wide range of participants. Our 
analysis includes: the importance of: persistency, all-weather, night and day capabilities, satellite image resolution, and 
other technical requirements. Hybrid threats, cyber warfare, GPS ‘spoofing’, jamming, and EMP are part of a new 
generation of threats becoming relevant with rapid space domain exploitation, in addition to space weather impact [1].
Keywords: Space-based platforms, applications, vulnerabilities 
1. INTRODUCTION
Asset Infrastructure: A wide range of global systems, on: land, sea, air, and in space, are vulnerable to military or 
terrorist action, e.g. electromagnetic pulse (EMP), besides solar weather. These sources may affect more than just ECDIS 
and GPS. For unprepared space-systems operators, solar weather in its severest form can remove much of a ship’s 
essential electrical infrastructure. Geomagnetic storms pose particular problems for space-based systems, such as GPS. 
When atmospheric transmission properties change unexpectedly, during storms, navigation fixes become inaccurate, and 
for short periods satellite signals may be lost completely. Protective measures against space weather are of vital 
importance to ESA, the EU, and the maritime community. Although GNSS has 3 critical segments: ground, space, and 
users, impact on space-based platforms directly impacts terrestrial users. Vessels are highly dependent on cyber-physical 
systems; navigation and control systems are vulnerable to solar weather and EMP. ECDIS, GNSS, and GPS system data 
provided by satellites for navigation and timing in turn feed ocean-going AIS, AIS compasses, GMDSS, besides other 
systems. Solar weather impact can be devastating, however deliberate targeting by EMP devices fitted to nanosatellites 
in the vicinity of critical space-based infrastructure could be as deadly, and if conducted in a coordinated manner, likely 
cause GPS and other networks to fail. Noise transmitted over GPS/GNSS frequencies raises levels to overload receiver 
circuitry, breaking signal lock; microwave or optical laser jamming can also deny, degrade or disrupt satellite 
performance. 
1.1 Overview of Digital Maritime Surveillance Technology 
Maritime surveillance today is cyber-space representation of what is happening over, on & under the physical domain of 
the sea surface and coastal areas, from various data products, to detect potential activities impacting security, safety, and 
economy of the environment. Space technology has supported maritime communities for over 30 years, benefiting them 
through enhanced navigation accuracy, GNSS (PNT) [2], and marine environmental monitoring and surveillance [3]. Sea 
poses unique challenges: small target detection; large survey areas; moving or changing targets and backgrounds. 
Maritime surveillance technology is a decisive factor in naval warfare and national security, and a force multiplier for 
successful operations. Advancing technologies play increasing roles in monitoring surveillance, relying on radar, and 
electro-optical solutions. Recently Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Inverse SAR (ISAR) have entered the 
operational theatre, providing opportunities in critical areas for Military or Civil authorities, with enhanced situational 
sea safety. Reduced space-based capabilities will significantly affect the ability to conduct maritime operations. 
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Space-based capabilities Military requirements for detailed satellite imagery globally, 24/7/365, is driving satellite 
providers to reassess how they conduct business. The primary solution today is imaging radar, which operates under 
cover of darkness and in challenging battlefield or environmental conditions. The military market is significant, yet 
potential for civil exploitation is larger, with governmental and pan-governmental users (e.g. the EU’s Copernicus 
programme) looking to provide detailed large-area views rapidly to end users. There are over 30 proposed satellite radar 
sensors, many of which will be realised. Key space-based capabilities include: 
1.1.1 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Satellite-based SAR is used widely in maritime surveillance due to its ability of 
achieving high resolution in both range and azimuth directions [4]. Unlike optical imagery, SAR is  unaffected by time 
of day, or meteorological conditions, meaning data acquisition can be made any time of day or night and independent of 
cloud coverage. When SAR satellite imagery is combined with Automatic Identification System (AIS) data in synergistic 
products, they provide a powerful tool for maritime surveillance, as AIS data can identify ships which SAR imagery 
detects, whilst SAR imagery detects ships which may not cooperate with AIS [5].  
1.1.2 AIS AIS is an automatic tracking system used on ships and by Vessel Traffic Services, identifies and locate vessels 
by electronically exchanging data with nearby ships. It is used extensively in the maritime world with vessel AIS 
transponders using GPS receivers to collect vessel position and movement details. Maritime security and tracking are 
important AIS applications, with 250,000+ ships now broadcasting on AIS, allowing terrestrial detection up to 50km 
away. Due to earth curvature restrictions information is only available around coastal zones or on a ship-to-ship basis. 
One company Nano Satisfi is looking at LEO nanosatellite fleets to provide vessel positions without costly uplinks. 
Nanosatellites, typically 1-10kg in mass, are a recent maritime satellite solution, developed at low cost, and in numbers 
for threat resilience, but without the capabilities of traditional systems, previously only affordable by wealthy nations. 
These offer emerging countries and actors the ability to deploy spacecraft rapidly from development to launch. 
Nanosatellites can operate in co-operative ways, providing increased loss resistance, as well as being harder to target 
than existing maritime drones. Satellites solves this problem, whereby a ship’s identity is recorded and decoded by 
satellite and sent to ground stations for further processing and distribution [6]. Known as S-AIS, it significantly increases 
the number of potential vessels within a satellite’s footprint. Since the mid-2000s companies have detected AIS 
transmissions with satellite-based receivers. ExactEarth and Spire, alongside government programs, have deployed AIS 
receivers on satellites.  
2. APPLICATIONS OF MARITIME SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
  The potential applications of maritime surveillance technology include:   
ISR- Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance encompasses multiple activities which relate to planning and 
operation of systems which support current and future military operations. Land, sea, air and space-based platforms have 
critical ISR roles in supporting operations.  
Piracy- The worldwide threat of terrorism and piracy in international waters is high and the need for solutions is 
paramount. For piracy surveillance, and recent terrorist attacks on Saudi shipping (2018), satellite-based vessel detection 
can integrate with conventional data streams to extend surveillance information to Coastguard, police, naval, intelligence 
services, customs and border guards. Satellite imagery gives a unique overview of what happens around a hijacked ship, 
and can monitor movements of mother ships and smaller craft swarms. A Copernicus-funded project supported the 
Italian Coast Guard tracking the oil tanker Caylyn Savina, pirated in the Indian Ocean in 2011, using COSMO-Skymed 
constellation satellite imagery. Data collected is now effective in preventing attacks before they happen. Denial of 
satellite imaging will hamper such operations. It is likely satellite ship monitoring will tackle illegal immigration as 
imagery resolution improves. 
Pollution and Oil Spill Surveillance- Oil slicks are visible in SAR imagery as dark areas. Most oil slicks are caused by 
ships emptying bilges before entering port. A satellite image can capture over 100,000km
2
 of sea surface at once; an 
efficient way to check for oil spills. Satellite-based optical with SAR are of special relevance for oil spill detection, 
providing high-resolution all weather, day and night, wide-area coverage. CleanSeaNet, an European satellite-based oil 
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spill and vessel detection service, uses SAR images from polar orbiting satellites. CleanSeaNet identifies and traces oil 
pollution on the sea surface from ships and offshore installations, and monitors accidental oil pollution at sea during 
emergencies. Sentinel 1 is a satellite-based SAR system that supports operational oil spill monitoring and vessel 
detection and tracking in Europe [7]. Disrupted data reception may limit effective early response. 
Ice Monitoring- Satellite-platform SAR data is valuable in monitoring seasonal or permanent ocean ice-cover in the 
Arctic, Baltic Sea, Bohai Sea, or Sea of Okhotsk. SAR images provide sea ice condition operational mapping for marine 
traffic or offshore operations. Sea ice cover change over recent years provides an indication of global warming, and is 
expected to strongly impact the Arctic environment. The Copernicus Marine Environment Monitoring Service 
(CMEMS) provides operational forecasts for sea ice to support Northern Sea ship routing, and search and rescue 
activities. The Sentinel-1A satellite allows frequent revisits (from daily). Satellite products are available (within 3 hours) 
to CMEMS operators who produce daily ice charts, iceberg density maps and maps of sea ice drift and deformation [3]. 
Infrequent data updates may increase collision risk.
Illegal Fishing- Illegal Unrecorded Unregulated (IUU) fishing has depleted fisheries to critical levels, yet IUU fishing 
persists as authorities cannot survey all seas simultaneously to stop it and protect marine species worldwide. London 
Economics (2015) reported 1 in 5 fish are taken illegally from the  oceans, costing the global economy an estimated 
£15.2Bbn p.a. Fishing vessel behaviour monitoring is critical to tackle this problem. In the UK, a prototype Information 
Analysis Platform was developed to analyse fishing vessel behaviour, and can potentially use freely available satellite 
data from providers such as NovaSAR, Sentinel-1, or CubeSats, and data used by Defra, the Fisheries Departments and 
other authorities to inform of illegal fishing in UK waters [8]. Satellite imaging operates independently of AIS, but if 
satellite-based AIS and imaging reception are disrupted illegal fishing may go undetected.  
Search and Rescue- Maritime surveillance technologies support search and rescue missions, detecting distressed vessels 
or missing aircraft or ships. Recent maritime operations have significantly changed priorities, providing a more effective 
approach to mass rescue operations highlighted by the Mediterranean crisis, and development of new search and rescue 
technology. Errors or outages in GPS information may hamper successful rescue of those in distress.  
Illegal Trading of Goods- Maritime security threats include illicit activities, e.g. transport of migrants, smuggling goods, 
or drug trafficking. In the EU large amounts of cigarettes and tobacco are smuggled from China at an estimated cost to 
the EU economy of 10bn Euros p.a., whilst drug smugglers use containerised sea transport as a simple, convenient and 
cost effective mode of transport as well as migrant transit [9]. NovaSAR is a constellation of 4 SAR satellites which once 
fully developed, will operate in all weather conditions, day and night. The UK allocated £21M to assist in development 
and launch of the first satellite in 2018. The Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre –Narcotics (MAOC-N), based in 
Lisbon, is an EU initiative involving 7 countries. The Centre uses integrated vessel information to monitor and track 
suspect vessels in the Atlantic and Mediterranean [10].  
Other threats, satellite imaging and RF detection may assist include: 
Anti-Terrorism Activities- Ships and seaports may be used to facilitate terrorist activities in different ways including: 
using ships as ‘bombs’; and weapons trafficking. Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) is a maritime surveillance 
operation led by NATO’s naval forces which patrol the Mediterranean and monitor shipping to help detect, defer and 
protect against terrorist activity. The operation evolved following terror attacks against the USA (Sept. 2001.)  
Port and Off-Shore Security- refers to the defence, law and treaty enforcement, and counterterrorism activities that fall 
within the port and maritime domain, including protecting seaports and harbours by monitoring facilities, storage areas 
and container depots. Current systems operate by scanning and observing all land and maritime zones for unauthorised 
activities continuously. If intruders are observed, the systems continue with identification and tracking of the intruders 
and direction of security forces.  
Autonomous Boat Navigation- Rolls-Royce began developing unmanned technology in 2013 and expects by 2025 there 
will be satellite remote controlled unmanned coastal vessels, and ocean-going ships by 2035. GPS reception disruption 
and consequent AIS output for unmanned vessels, will have a significant impact.  
Land-based Applications- Surveillance can gather information to support maritime-based activities, and provide benefits 
in observing and supporting land-based activities in the littoral environment. Applications include: Agriculture: Forestry: 
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Risk Management, and Disaster Monitoring: where satellites  monitor areas affected by disasters e.g. flooding, tsunami, 
critical for timely disaster relief efforts, allowing for rapid response to priority areas captured in images.   
3. SPACE PLATFORM THREATS
Good cyber-security at organisational and personal levels is essential if threats to space-based GPS, AIS, and other data 
are to be neutralised effectively. The size of geospatial vectors in raster and point cloud data make them obvious targets 
for computer-based-learning algorithms. The importance placed on GPS, and AIS by end users is clear. Subversive 
space-based attacks on GPS-satellite platforms will likely attempt exploitation by new methods as well as traditional 
attacks. Likely attack routes include: jamming, EMP devices, direct satellite destruction (bomb or kinetic device), or 
laser-based weapons. Anti-satellite (ASAT) demonstrations prove kinetic capabilities; a recent Indian ASAT test took 
place at an altitude low enough that debris burned up in the atmosphere [11-12]. Kinetic systems create permanent and 
irreversible space asset destruction, whilst electronic and cyber provide temporary disruption and damage to space 
systems. Some states are moving away from expensive consumable direct-ascent missiles to affordable and available 
long lasting electronic and cyber methods that impact space assets. In addition co-orbital satellite systems (COSAT) 
systems are satellites place on similar orbits directed to intercept or interfere with other adjacent satellites through close 
orbital rendezvous operations. Threats may also be provided from high altitude pseudo-satellite platforms.  
GPS jamming or spoofing of a satellite may prevent ephemeris ground station updates. A small space jammer can disrupt 
the satellites GPS signal reception as effectively as a small terrestrial GPS jammer can disrupt proximity receivers. 
Protocol-specific attacks [RF] or ‘messing with in-built commands.’ attack systems through flaws in data protocols, and 
Software-specific attacks [SW] or ‘messing with the data’. Implementation threats exploit vulnerabilities in service 
provider systems, attacking collection and vessel information visualisation. Ground station update authentication must 
ensure transmitters are genuine, and time-stamped. Integrity tampering is vital so valid data checks are required, e.g. is 
geographical information correct and of the expected type? Data location must be cross-checked across other valid data 
sources. Fake reports or numerous false GMDSS satellite alarms may be broadcast, triggering satellite response. 
Spoofing ‘hijacks’ a satellite’s command and control, and feeding it false data is a known means of disruption, available 
to the US since 2004. We must build protection for critical space-based infrastructure, covering space, maritime and 
terrestrial systems, for military and civil operations. At present the main protection means from solar weather is 
increased warning time. However, co-ordinated attacks from nanosatellite threats may happen without warning. Satellite 
swarms may provide some protection against sudden catastrophic system loss, but ‘hunter-killer’ nanosatellites armed 
with EMP generators may degrade systems overall. Hardening all space-based systems to military grade EMP protection 
is unfeasible, nor affordable. Early examples of Chinese scientists ‘blinding’ optical satellites with ground-based laser 
guns (2005), were followed by Russian Federation laser-based A-60 aircraft ASAT operation, dazzling and blinding 
sensors to result in physical damage. In each case correct threat hazard evaluation from multiple intelligence sources and 
integration will determine various courses of action, likely objectives, desired outcomes, and how to prioritise them.  
4. STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONNAIRE RESEARCH METHOD
Surveillance technical capabilities-: From 4 years of discussion with civilian and military global space and maritime 
professionals we report their views on current and future space-based requirements, coming from upstream satellite data 
providers and launchers, as well as the downstream user sector. Consultation took place via face-to-face interview, 
telephone consultation, email or questionnaire. We received responses from 90 stakeholders and we summarise this 
engagement from these responses. Respondents indicated specific capabilities of space surveillance systems importance, 
rating importance of ‘night & day’, 24/7 capabilities; ‘all-weather’ capability, and ‘persistency’, on a scale of 1 (not at all 
important) to 5 (very important) and were asked about AIS, data-acquisition temporal frequency requirements. Maritime 
professionals stated the most important capability with geographical interest.  Analysis, taken with other data revealed 
the types of service/s of interest to participating organisations with weighted importance, differing by nation and between 
upstream or downstream. Fig.1 provides the geographical distribution of the questionnaire respondents, with breakdown 
by global region. Ninety stakeholders gave answers to some or all of the questions presented. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Stakeholders’ views. 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Persistency: providing maritime/littoral surveillance of an area for prolonged periods is a high requirement for 
downstream satellite users. Ten Middle East Downstream responses, from 3 nations, had very high regard: 90% 
responding 4-5 (Fig. 2). Typical comments: “The persistent system would be required in the event of a piracy incident, 
enabling surveillance of movement of hostages”; a common criticism was “We do not have the capacity to process data 
any faster than weekly, except in crisis conditions following a piracy incident.” Eleven Upstream Company returns (Fig. 
3) from launch sector companies gave good correlation with downstream categories (4-5). It may be inferred upstream 
companies are judging the end-user market well.
Figure 2. Middle East Downstream Persistency Responses.  Figure 3. Downstream Persistency Responses. 
Combining together both the upstream and downstream response from the 31 individual sources a more balanced overall 
assessment is provided (fig 4.) 
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Figure 4. Persistency Upstream and Downstream results. 
Night-Day capability Qatari Coastguard End user ‘Night-Day’ importance data is shown (Fig. 5). Typical responses: 
“Because you want a safe coast you have to work night and day and in all weather conditions,” and “Our mission has to 
be done 24/7 partial coverage would not offer the operational capability requirement.” 
Figure 5. Qatar Coastguard Night-Day.  Figure 6. Saudi Arabian Temporal Frequency Requirements. 
Temporal Surveillance The perception of temporal range requirements from thirteen Saudi Arabian end-users, are 
spaced a cross the range (Fig. 6), but favour at least daily measurements. Frequency requirements vary. Some 
respondents gave more than one answer. One South American response on this temporal issue stated “An hourly 
frequency is enough to hail all ships inside the area of maritime operation.” Another UK response “Guaranteed daily, 
and then hourly when needed would be very useful for flooding applications.” There is no universal specific frequency 
requirement but frequency requirements are universal. 
Current resolution requirements are extremely variable. For general updates of the maritime picture daily updates are 
sufficient, i.e. domain (fig 7.) In terms of target selection type, (fig. 8), skiffs up to 10m and small fast boats c. 20ft 
provide a dominant category 43%. 1-3m resolution allows vessel recognition, whilst 300m+ is sufficient for tankers or 
large ships. 10% state sub-km resolution, nearly ¼  require 1-30m medium resolution. 16% want optical resolution 
below one metre, and 25% of respondents state they require high resolution SAR. Nearly ¼ of end-users require domain 
awareness. Responses from 14 upstream/downstream stakeholders show Fast boats/skiffs are the main category, which if 
combined with 5m accounts for 72%. One Qatar response “4-5m rib, look for clear view of any vessel entering Qatar 
Coast illegally to be able to complete successful mission without putting any Coastguard personnel in danger.” 
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. 
Figure 7. Current Resolution.  Figure 8. Target Selection. 
Most important space-based capability we gauged perception of the importance of sensing and communications 
abilities from various maritime professionals. 33 UK respondents provided evidence of the overwhelming importance of 
GPS, being the single-most important space-based capability (Fig. 9). 
Figure 9. Most important capability. 
The importance of GIS, usually reliant upon GPS input, is clear in fig. 10 from the Saudi Arabian response to “what 
percentage of your data requires GIS input in some form”? Clearly the biggest category with nearly half of respondents 
(18) required 41-60% of data of a geographical information system-related nature, e.g. AIS. This view is further
confirmed by Qatar respondents on the importance of AIS capabilities fig. 11.
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Figure 10 Importance of GIS to Saudia Arabian responses.  Figure 11 Importance of GIS to Qatar responses. 
 
All-Weather capability: Nine Downstream Qatar respondents indicated here, this capability was dominant, i.e. very 
important, with eight out of nine responses in categories 4-5 (fig. 12). A typical Coastguard response of all-weather 




Figure 12. All-Weather Capability 
The Qatar downstream All weather requirements correlates very well with the overall upstream results from sixteen 
corporate correspondents (fig 13.), and also with the combination of all upstream and downstream responses (fig 14.) 
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This paper provided discussion of current space-based assets, applications, importance and vulnerabilities, with 
quantified findings covering: persistence, Night-Day, S-AIS, surveillance frequency, resolution and target selection, with 
all-weather capabilities. Some market-players interviewed stress the trend towards Smart Data Analytics, with mixed 
optical/SAR tailored information, improving SAR utility and earth observation data. SAR is a strong market-area within 
maritime persistent stare, supporting commercialisation of space-based high resolution SAR with other capabilities, 
likely in consortia composed of multiple partners. One UAE respondent expressed the aspiration for “A satellite which 
can provide earth imaging, detecting piracy, reckoning and illegal ships”. Expectations, in some cases between upstream 
and downstream are well-matched, and less so in other categories. Mismatch between user and supply groups is 
important, and shows there is work to be done gauging and bridging demand for specific customer services, matching 
upstream with downstream users. The range of responses is considered representative of the space-based maritime 
security and surveillance markets, which have grown in recent years and will continue to grow over coming decades. 
With increased use of advanced on-board processing, all digital components, software-defined radios, packet-based 
protocols, and high performance cloud-computing, the attack potential for cyber and physical attack is greatly expanded.  
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